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POSTHUMOUS REPUGNANCY 
(Penultimate draft—please cite final version 




I argue that the possibility of posthumous harm ought to be rejected. My 
argument centers on a kind of repugnancy case involving posthumous 
harm. Supposing the existence of posthumous harm, a person whose 
wellbeing was extremely high while she was alive could incur small 
posthumous harms over a long enough period such that it is true of that 
person that she had a life not worth living. I respond to various objections 
and in the end conclude that rejecting posthumous harm is preferable to 
all other options. 
 
§1. Introduction 
What does a life not worth living look like? A life spent in a state of constant and 
overwhelming physical suffering would not be worth living. A life in which every conscious 
experience was that of intense emotional anguish would not be a life worth living. But 
what about a life that was exceptionally good, day in and day out, right up until the 
moment of death? Could that life wind up being one not worth living? Could that life 
wind up being not worth living, not because of any big terrible tragedy, but merely because 
of great many minor harms? If it is possible to be harmed after death, then yes, that life 
could wind up being one not worth living. The possibility of posthumous harm entails 
 
1 For all their help I have to thank Mike Huemer, David Boonin, Graham Oddie, an audience at the 
University of Colorado Center for Values and Social Policy, and, especially, Chris Heathwood. 
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that one could have an exceptionally good life (by any standard) while one was alive but 
incur so many small posthumous harms that one actually had a life not worth living. But 
we should not accept that. Instead, the possibility of posthumous harm should be 
rejected.2     
My argument centers on a kind of repugnancy case involving posthumous harm.3 
Supposing the existence of posthumous harm, a person whose wellbeing was extremely 
high while she was alive could incur small posthumous harms over a long enough period 
such that it is true of that person that she had a life not worth living.  
The overall argument will be that the possibility of Posthumous Repugnancy ought 
to be rejected, and since the possibility of posthumous harm entails the possibility of 
Posthumous Repugnancy, we ought to reject the possibility of posthumous harm. After 
defending the premises from a variety of objections, I conclude that rejecting the 
possibility of posthumous harm in the face of Posthumous Repugnancy is preferable to all 
other alternatives. While I may not sway the dug-in, die-hard, posthumous harm 
proponent, I will have left an acute problem for them to face.  
 
2 I am assuming a few other claims about wellbeing and harm that I take to be uncontroversial, namely: 
(1) S is harmed by x only if x negatively affects S’s wellbeing in some way, whatever way that is. (2) Harm 
is additive. And (3) If S’s wellbeing is net negative enough, then S had a life not worth living. I take (1) to 
be analytically true and (2) and (3) to be putatively true. Evaluating possible variations on (2) will occupy 
most of §7. 
3 My case will be structurally similar to that of Derek Parfit’s “Repugnant Conclusion”, Chapter 17, in 
Reasons and Persons (1984). The Repugnant Conclusion is the thesis that: Compared with the existence of 
very many people—say, ten billion—all of whom have a very high quality of life, there must be some much 
larger number of people whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better, even though these people 
would have lives that are barely worth living. In “Overpopulation and Quality of Life” (2004) Parfit imagines 
a different person-level analogue of the repugnant conclusion. His involves a choice between living a Century 
of Ecstasy vs. a Drab Eternity. I’ll return to this case specifically in §6.    
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§2. The possibility of posthumous harm 
Philosophers of many stripes have found compelling the idea that a subject can be harmed 
after their death. Endorsements of, or arguments for, the possibility of posthumous harm 
can be found in Nagel (1970), Feinberg (1984), Levenbook (1984), Pitcher (1984), Parfit 
(1984), Grover (1989), Sefrani (1990), Luper (2004, 2007), Belliotti (2012), Boonin (2019)4 
even as far back as Aristotle (Nicomachean Ethics, 1100a15-25).  
The case for the possibility of posthumous harm rests crucially on a particular 
intuition about desire satisfaction and harm. Nearly all discussions of posthumous harm 
center on hypothetical cases in which some agent’s desires are being frustrated while that 
agent is completely unaware of the frustration. Intuitively, the agent is being harmed by 
those frustrations. An oft-cited example comes from Feinberg: 
If someone spreads a libelous description of me among a group whose good 
opinion I covet and cherish, altogether without my knowledge, I have been 
injured in virtue of the harm done my interest in a good reputation, even 
though I never learn what has happened. That is because I have an interest, 
so I believe, in having a good reputation as such, in addition to my interest 
in avoiding hurt feelings, embarrassment, and economic injury. And that 




4 David Boonin’s Dead Wrong (2019) is an excellent resource and a forcefully argued defense of the 
posthumous harm thesis. I will not discuss Boonin’s book at any length because the problem I raise is not 
one he discusses. Nor is the problem I raise one that can be effectively dealt by utilizing his various other 
defenses of the posthumous harm thesis. Where Boonin’s discussion and mine most explicitly overlap is 
their discussion of the problem of non-arbitrarily prioritizing felt harms over unfelt harms. This is addressed 
in §7 of this paper, where I will make a brief note regarding the relevance of Boonin’s views.   
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Many authors have taken this passage from Feinberg as a natural starting point in 
their discussions of posthumous harm. But it is important to note that the case Feinberg 
gives is not enough on its own to establish the possibility of posthumous harm. Feinberg 
is describing a case in which one is harmed but completely unaware of those events that 
are harming them. This leaves open the possibility that it is the felt effects of the unknown 
events that are responsible for those events being harmful and not the unknown frustration 
of their desires. On that interpretation of the case, it is clearly not analogous to being 
harmed after death. Establishing that unknown events can harm is not sufficient to 
establish that posthumous events can harm. To establish the possibility of posthumous 
harm it must be that one can be harmed but be completely unaffected by the harm at 
any time in the future, and not just unaware of it. To stave off a challenge to Feinberg 
on these grounds, it is useful to supplement his case with some comments from Nagel’s 
1970 paper “Death”. In that paper Nagel rejects an objection to his position on the grounds 
that it would also rule out posthumous and unfelt harms: 
[This] type of objection is expressed in general form by the common remark 
that what you don't know can't hurt you. It means that even if a man is 
betrayed by his friends, ridiculed behind his back, and despised by people 
who treat him politely to his face, none of it can be counted as a misfortune 
for him so long as he does not suffer as a result. It means that a man is not 
injured if his wishes are ignored by the executor of his will, or if, after his 
death, the belief becomes current that all the literary works on which his 
fame rests were really written by his brother, who died in Mexico at the age 
of twenty-eight. It seems to me worth asking what assumptions about good 
and evil lead to these drastic restrictions. (Nagel 1970, p. 76, emphasis 
added) 
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I’ll refer to these sorts of cases—cases of unknown desire frustration that in no way 
affects the one whose desires are being frustrated—as “Nagel-Feinberg cases”. I’ll refer to 
the intuition that the agent is harmed in such cases as the “Nagel-Feinberg intuition”.  
The posthumous harm view is not complicated. It takes our Nagel-Feinberg 
intuitions about posthumous Nagel-Feinberg cases to be correct. Thus, one can be harmed 
by the frustration of their desires—the frustration of which has no effect on their 
experiences. Because a person can desire that certain things happen after their death, they 
can be posthumously harmed by those things not happening.5  
For my purposes, I will bracket concerns as to whether the dead have desires, 
whether posthumous harm requires an untenable backwards causation, and whether the 
sort of desire satisfaction principle that undergirds the possibility of posthumous harm is 
defensible in the first place.6 My task specifically is to bring attention to a previously 
unidentified and highly implausible result of the possibility of posthumous harm.  
I also want to make a note about methodology before going further. Throughout 
 
5 I realize that my characterization here makes it sound as if it is only via a desire-satisfaction principle 
that one could argue for the possibility of posthumous harm. That is certainly not the case. What is true, 
however, is that the possibility of posthumous harm has been defended almost exclusively by appeal to 
examples involving supposedly harmful posthumous desire frustrations. Further, unrestricted desire-
satisfaction views (or sometimes just principles) of wellbeing are attractive in their own right, and an 
unrestricted desire-satisfaction principle, in conjunction with a few other widely held theses, entails the 
possibility of posthumous harm.  
6 There are many who raise such concerns. For example, Partridge (1981) argues against the dead having 
interests or desires. Portmore (2007) argues that to be plausible at all any desire satisfaction theory of 
wellbeing will have to restrict which desires can affect one’s wellbeing, and further that those restriction 
rule out the possibility of posthumous harm. But it should be said that posthumous harm is possible on a 
variety of views, and not just a view according to which all that is intrinsically good or bad for a person is 
whether or not their desires are satisfied or frustrated.  
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this paper, I follow proponents of the possibility of posthumous harm and take as 
legitimate a philosophical methodology that relies heavily on hypothetical cases, 
intuitions, and the weighing of intuitions against one another. I will, like Nagel, Feinberg, 
and especially Parfit, appeal to considerations of comparative intuitiveness and 
plausibility. One might very reasonably take issue with such an approach to moral 
philosophy, but I will not do so here. I am confronting the proponents of posthumous 
harm on their own methodological turf. 
   
§3. Posthumous Repugnancy   
Suppose one is posthumously harmed when one’s desires are posthumously frustrated. 
Now, imagine a person named Rosa with what looks like a great life. During her life Rosa 
saw all her goals realized and all her projects completed to her deep satisfaction. She died 
peacefully, perfectly contented with how her life had gone at the age of 100. Few are as 
lucky as Rosa. But Rosa had one desire left to be satisfied—she desired that it would 
always be the case that whenever she was spoken of after her death, only positive things 
were said of her. It was not a very strong desire of hers, but she desired it nonetheless, 
and it was the one desire left unfulfilled when Rosa died. In fact, it was the only desire 
she ever had concerning what would happen after her death.  
Unfortunately for Rosa, most everyone quickly forgot about her except for her 
neighbors who thought she was the Anti-Christ. The neighbors founded a cult whose 
central belief was that Rosa was the enemy of all that was good. The cult’s daily 
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observances were all centered on speaking ill of Rosa. This happened only among cult 
members, for no one else had been willing to listen to them for some time.  
Rosa is, according to the hypothesis, repeatedly harmed by the repeated frustration 
of her desire that only positive things were said about her every time she was spoken of 
after her death.7 Suppose the cult keeps this up for generations, perhaps thousands of 
years. Nothing positive is ever said of Rosa, and so unfortunately, she is never 
posthumously benefitted, only harmed. At some point, enough posthumous harm has been 
done to Rosa to outweigh all the positive value of her lived life. Eventually, her wellbeing 
will be net negative enough such that it is true that she had a life not worth living. This 
is despite the fact that while she was alive, she had as good a life as anyone could hope 
for. Rosa’s case is merely an illustration. The particular details don’t matter. The example 
could be amended in whatever way necessary to illustrate the following, which is entailed 
by the possibility of posthumous harm, and which I call Posthumous Repugnancy: 
Posthumous Repugnancy (PR) – A person whose wellbeing was extremely 
high while they were alive could incur small posthumous harms over a long 
enough period such that it is true in the long run that they had a life not 
worth living.8   
 
Objections come to mind immediately. The next several sections are devoted to 
 
7 The next section is devoted entirely to responding to the worry that a desire cannot be frustrated 
repeatedly and thus that this claim is false.  
8 Here I have formulated PR as if the Time of Object View of desire satisfaction is true. That is the view 
according to which the satisfaction of a desire benefits me at just those times when the desire’s object 
obtains. In the next section, I will demonstrate how PR can be reformulated to be compatible with the 
Time of Desire View of desire satisfaction. That is the view according to which a desire’s satisfaction benefits 
me at just those time when I have the desire. 
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responding to objections. §4 will addresses the objection that I have unjustifiably assumed 
the Time of Desire View of desire satisfaction to be false. §5 addresses the objection that 
Rosa cannot be harmed repeatedly by the repeated frustration of one desire as described. 
§6 addresses the response that, though prima facie implausible, we ought to just accept 
PR, just as many have accepted Parfit’s original Repugnant Conclusion (RC). §7 responds 
to the objection that the possibility of posthumous harm does entail the possibility of 
Posthumous Repugnancy because even if Rosa can be repeatedly harmed by the repeated 
frustration of this desire, she can be harmed only so much by the frustration of that desire 
and thus the posthumous harms never sufficiently aggregate to render her life not worth 
living.9  
 
9 Bramble (2016: p. 89) briefly makes an argument similar to mine. He points out that Emily Dickinson, 
Van Gogh, Nick Drake, and others, had all-things-considered unfortunate lives, however, they all have 
enjoyed massive posthumous success. If posthumous benefit is possible, then we have to say that their lives 
weren’t that bad after all, but clearly their lives were that bad after all. Therefore, according Bramble, there 
is no such thing as posthumous benefit (or harm). The only way one might resist his argument, Bramble 
imagines, is by claiming that posthumous harms and benefits are only ever slight. He dismisses this 
possibility in a footnote, saying, “But in order to believe this we would need some principled reason to 
believe that posthumous benefits and harms could only ever be slight. I cannot myself think of what such 
a reason could be.” I agree with Bramble, and though my core argument is similar to his, my overall defense 
of the impossibility of posthumous harm goes well beyond his. First, coming up with a problem case—
Bramble’s Van Gogh et al, or my Rosa—is only the first part of making the case against posthumous harm. 
As important, and much more arduous, is the task of defending those problem cases against various defeating 
interpretations. Bramble’s defends his argument with only what I have quoted—he cannot think of a reason 
why posthumous benefits and harms could only ever be slight. In contrast, the majority my paper is spent 
responding to objections. Secondly, according to Bramble, his argument would be thwarted if it could be 
shown that posthumous harms and benefits are only ever slight ones. My argument would not be similarly 
thwarted because Rosa’s case involves only slight posthumous harms. If by “slight harm” Bramble actually 
means “slight even in the aggregate”, then I address that exact issue in §7.  Third, there is a plausible 
objection to Bramble’s argument that he does not address, and which does not apply to mine. One could 
object to Bramble’s argument by claiming that Van Gogh et al primarily desired success during their 
lifetime. They might have had no desire to be only posthumously successful. If that were the case, which 
seems plausible at least, then one could maintain that while posthumous benefit is possible, these people’s 
lives were nonetheless not improved by their posthumous success since they did not desire to be successful 
in that way. That response both maintains that there is posthumous benefit but also explains how it is that 
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§4. The Time of Desire View and Time of Object View 
Assuming I am benefitted when my desires are satisfied, there is a question of when I am 
benefitted. If I desire right now that there is nice weather for my bike ride this weekend 
and the weather is nice for my bike ride, when did the satisfaction of that desire benefit 
me? Was I benefitted at just those times when I had the desire (Time of Desire View), or 
was I benefitted at just those times when the object of my desire obtained (Time of Object 
View), or was I benefit at just those times when I had the desire and its object obtained 
(Concurrentism)?10   
I have formulated the Rosa example as if the Time of Object View is correct. Rosa’s 
welfare is negatively affected at those times when she is slandered after her death. It is 
objected that if the Time of Desire View is true, then the Rosa example doesn’t work, and 
more importantly Posthumous Repugnancy is not possible. The idea is straightforward. 
 
these people’s lives were not made better to any significant extent by their posthumous success. I don’t 
think this objection to Bramble is ultimately successful, but it is plausible that on a clearer understanding 
of Van Gogh et al’s desires it can be claimed that their posthumous success was of no great benefit to them 
despite posthumous benefit being possible. In contrast, Rosa’s desires are stipulated. There is thus no way 
to make a similar objection that on a proper understanding of her desires, Rosa is actually not harmed by 
all the posthumous slander, despite posthumous harm being possible. Finally, Posthumous Repugnancy 
appears to be a nastier problem than the one Bramble raises. It appears far more unintuitive that Rosa’s 
great life could be not worth living due to the aggregation of slight posthumous harms than it is unintuitive 
that Van Gogh’s life was at least slightly less bad given stunning, worldwide, multi-generational posthumous 
success.  
10 For an excellent discussion of these positions and the problems they face, see Lin (2017). Concurrentism 
is thought to be incompatible with posthumous harm. I will thus set aside Concurrentism and focus on what 
most people take the posthumous harm proponents two options to be—the Time of Desire View or the 
Time of Object View. Lin defends another option—Asymmetrism—according to which The Time of Desire 
View is true of past-directed desires and the Time of Object View is true of future-directed desires. Since 
desires about things after our death are always future directed desires Lin’s position is equivalent, in this 
discussion, to the Time of Object View. 
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If it is true that Rosa is harmed by all the posthumous slanders at the time she has the 
relevant desire (which is when she is alive), then it is not true that she had exceptionally 
high wellbeing while she was alive. So it is not the case that she had an exceptionally good 
life while alive, only for her to be posthumously harmed enough by the aggregation of 
many small posthumous harms to have a life not worth living. 
In response, if the Time of Desire View is true, then the PR must simply be 
reformulated. What distinguishes the Time of Desire and Time of Object interpretations 
of Rosa’s case is not whether she is harmed, or how much she is harmed. The views 
disagree only on when it is that she is harmed and thus disagree on when it is that her 
life is made one not worth living. On the Time of Object View her life is made not worth 
living once she is slandered enough times after death for the aggregate harm to outweigh 
the positive wellbeing she accrued while living. On the Time of Desire View, Rosa’s life 
becomes not worth living as soon as she forms the desire to be spoken of only positively 
after death. The Time of Desire formulation of Posthumous Repugnancy would thus be: 
Posthumous Repugnancy TDV (PR2) – A person whose wellbeing is extremely 
high could suddenly have a life not worth living solely in virtue of forming a weak 
desire that will be frustrated a vast number of times after their death.   
 
The Time of Desire View formulation is substantially different from PR’s initial 
Time of Object formulation, however it appears no less repugnant. Both formulations 
share the essential repugnant feature. Both are cases where a great deal of positive 
wellbeing is swamped by a massive number of small posthumous harms. The difference 
is simply when the swamping happens, or rather when things get repugnant, but not 
     
 11 
whether things get repugnant. Thus, I conclude that the Time of Desire is not 
incompatible with Posthumous Repugnancy suitably formulated.  
 
§5. Desire frustration and repeated harm 
Philosophers are surprisingly silent on the issue of whether or not a token desire can be 
satisfied or frustrated more than once. It is true that many desires, given their objects, 
can be satisfied or frustrated only once. If I desire that my package be delivered by 3pm 
today, then that desire will either be frustrated or satisfied come 3pm. The package can 
be delivered only once, and 3pm-today will come around only once. But not all desires are 
like this. Suppose I desire that my friends be honest with me. Prima facie, that sort of 
desire does not have just one chance of being frustrated or satisfied like my 3pm package 
delivery desire does. 
Rosa’s Posthumous Repugnancy case presumes that her desire to be spoken of only 
positively whenever she is spoken of after her death can be frustrated repeatedly. More 
generally, the view I am presuming is that a single token desire that x of an agent S can 
be frustrated or satisfied so long as 1) S desires that x, and 2) the object of the desire, x, 
is such that the states of affairs that would satisfy or frustrate that particular desire that 
x can repeatedly obtain. Call this view the “multiple-frustrations view” for short.  The 
alternative to the multiple-frustrations view is that a token desire can be frustrated or 
satisfied only once. Call this the “one-frustration view”.  
The objection I want to address claims that Rosa’s desire to be spoken of only 
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positively whenever she is spoken of after death can be frustrated just once. Therefore, 
she cannot incur repeated posthumous harms that aggregate to the point that renders her 
life not worth living. The first time someone said something bad about Rosa after her 
death her desire was frustrated and that was the end of the story. If the one-frustration 
view of desire frustration is correct, goes the objection, then posthumous repugnancy cases 
like Rosa’s are ruled out, for they require that some desire(s) be repeatedly frustrated.  
 It turns out that there is no version of a one-frustration view that the posthumous 
harm proponent can reasonably accept and which would make this objection work. 
Consider Michael and Dwight, who for five years both had equally strong desires that 
their romantic partners not cheat on them. Over the course of those five years, Michael’s 
partner cheated on him only once, while Dwight’s partner cheated on him 50 times. 
Michael’s partner’s infidelity was a mere illicit kiss that led to nothing more. Dwight’s 
partner’s infidelity started with one illicit kiss, but quickly escalated to a multiyear 
passionate love affair. Neither Michael nor Dwight ever found out about these infidelities, 
nor did they experience any effects of their partner’s indiscretions. Michael and Dwight’s 
cases are Nagel-Feinberg cases.  
Remember that we are supposing in our discussion that the Nagel-Feinberg 
intuition that agents are genuinely harmed in Nagel-Feinberg case is correct. We are thus 
not considering whether or not Michael and Dwight have been harmed at all. We are 
supposing that Michael and Dwight have been harmed. The question is—have they been 
harmed equally? Obviously not, it seems. The intuition that Dwight has been harmed 
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more seems just as strong as the intuition that they have been harmed in the first place. 
Even if one denies that there is unfelt harm, they would surely accept the conditional that 
if there is unfelt harm, then Dwight was harmed more than Michael in this case.  
I have introduced Dwight and Michael’s case because there appears no way to 
explain how Dwight and Michael are harmed unequally while maintaining that Rosa’s 
case is not possible. I endorse a multiple-frustrations view and according to it Dwight is 
harmed more because Dwight’s desire was frustrated more times than Michael’s. If a 
multiple frustrations view is true, then Rosa’s case works as described.  
A proponent of a one-frustration view could get the Michael and Dwight case right 
by claiming that Dwight is harmed more than Michael because Dwight’s desire was 
frustrated only once but to a greater degree than Michael’s. However, on this the one-
frustration view plus degrees of desire frustration, Rosa’s case works once re-described as 
a case of her desire being frustrated to an increasing degree over time (and the harmfulness 
of the frustration increasing commensurately).11  
A proponent of a one-frustration view could get the Michael and Dwight case right 
by claiming that Dwight was harmed more than Michael because Dwight had a 
constellation of very similar fidelity-related desires and each of his partner’s infidelities 
frustrated a different one. However, on this constellation of similar desires view Rosa’s 
case works once re-described as her many of her very similar desires being frustrated over 
 
11 I should say that I think the correct view is multiple-frustration plus degrees of frustration. There is much 
more to be said about this topic, but I’ve tried to keep this section brief.  
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a very long period of time.  
Rosa’s case would be ruled out on a view according to which her desire that only 
positive things be said of her after her death is frustrated only once, and further she has 
no other similar desires that would be frustrated by the posthumous slander. However, on  
that particular one-frustration view, Michael and Dwight are harmed equally, for they 
held the same desire at the same strength, which was frustrated for each of them only 
once. But it is unbelievable that Michael and Dwight would be harmed equally. Michael’s 
partner kissed another person. Dwight’s partner had a long-standing love affair with 
another person. I conclude therefore that if there is a problem with the Rosa case, it is 
not that her desire is frustrated only once and therefore no more harm can come to her 
after that.  
 
§6. The costs of accepting Posthumous Repugnancy 
Perhaps the posthumous harm proponent ought to bite the bullet and accept Posthumous 
Repugnancy. Derek Parfit’s “Repugnant Conclusion”, from which PR takes its name, has 
been accepted by many philosophers despite its apparent implausibility. Why not do the 
same with PR? In this section I argue that against this strategy.  
Hartry Field argues that one reason to reject an epistemicist account of vagueness 
is that it is unreasonable to fear that noon tomorrow might be the moment you become 
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old.12 Epistemicism is committed to there being sharp cutoffs in vague cases. So, though 
it can be vague whether you are old, there is some magic moment in time when it goes 
from being true that you are not old, to being true that you are old. Field argues that 
since one could not reasonably fear that the cut off is imminent, we have reason to think 
it does not exist, and so we have reason to reject epistemicism.  
 An analogous point can be made here. Suppose Will had a really awesome life, and 
he knew it. He knows he’s a couple hours from death. He is told that, “You know, some 
people incur small posthumous harms over a long enough period of time such that even 
though life was really great for them while they were alive, they in fact had a life not 
worth living.” Could Will at that moment reasonably fear that contrary to everything he 
has experienced in his life, he in fact had a life not worth living? I do not think so. This 
reveals what I call the: 
No Reasonable Fear of Posthumous Repugnancy Intuition: Any person 
whose wellbeing was extremely high while they were alive could not, right 
before their death, reasonably fear that enough small posthumous harms 
might add up such that they in fact, and contrary to everything they have 
experienced, had a life not worth living.  
 
Contrast this to someone who is 30 and knows they have probably 70 more years of life 
left. They have no idea how those 70 years are going to go. They could reasonably fear 
that enough harm will befall them in those 70 years such that in the end they will have 
 
12 Field (2010). Epistemicism is the view that vagueness is an epistemic phenomenon, specifically vagueness 
consists in a special kind of ignorance. If it is vague whether p then it is either true that p or true that not 
p, however it is unknowable which it is. The locus classicus defense of epistemicism is Williamson (1994). 
See also Sorenson (1988, 2001). 
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had a life not worth living. They know there is plenty of time left for them to be harmed 
that much. But the same is not true of Will. Employing Field’s strategy, because it would 
be unreasonable to fear PR, i.e. because of the No Reasonable Fear of Posthumous 
Repugnancy Intuition, we have strong reason to doubt the possibility of posthumous 
harm. Admittedly, the No Reasonable Fear of Posthumous Repugnancy Intuition does 
not constitute a decisive reason to reject PR. It is just an intuition. But remember that 
intuition plays a central role in justifying the possibility of posthumous harm in the first 
place. The posthumous harm view is supported largely on the basis of Nagel-Feinberg 
intuitions that persons can be harmed while their experiences are unaffected by those 
harms.  
The No Reasonable Fear of Posthumous Repugnancy Intuition concerns what 
attitudes it would be reasonable to have towards PR. A related intuition is worth 
mentioning as well. The No Reasonable Preventative Suicide Intuition concerns what 
actions it would be reasonable to take in light of PR. Suppose that I am told that 
tomorrow I will be kidnapped and tortured ceaselessly, but kept alive, for decades. Taken 
as a whole, my life will have been so bad as to not have been worth living. I could intervene 
however. I could kill myself today, before I am kidnapped. This would ensure that the 
events that would render my life not worth living—the decades of torture—would never 
come to pass. I will have died having had a life worth living.  
Under these conditions, it is reasonable to entertain preventive suicide. It is 
plausible that for any person who knows that their life will truly end up not being worth 
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living because of x, it would be reasonable for that person to choose to end their life to 
prevent x.  
But what about for Rosa? Remember Rosa had an amazing life but incurred enough 
small harms after death such that she had a life worth living. Imagine you saw Rosa on 
her 30th birthday and told her the bad news. “Look Rosa, I’m sorry but you are going to 
wind up with a life not worth living. Sure, the next 70 years up until your death will be 
downright awesome, but so many small harms will befall to you after death that it will 
be true you had a life not worth living. Luckily, you have some options. You could kill 
yourself today. Sadly, you would miss out on the next 70 years of great life, but it will 
ensure that you are not posthumously harmed such that you end up having had a life not 
worth living. You have to act now and end your life or else suffer the terrible fate of 
Posthumous Repugnancy.”  
Would it be reasonable for Rosa to choose to end her life? Intuitively, definitely 
not. It seems absurd that she would kill herself and miss out on 70 more great years just 
to avoid the aggregation of many small posthumous harms. This is intuition is the: 
No Reasonable Preventative Suicide Option Intuition: Any person who 
knows they have decades of high-quality life ahead of them could not 
reasonably choose to commit suicide and forgo those years merely to prevent 
a large enough number of small posthumous harms.  
 
Just as before, the intuition that it would be unreasonable to choose preventative 
suicide under such conditions is not decisive against the possibility of posthumous harm.  
But again, intuition is absolutely central to the defense of the possibility of posthumous 
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harm in the first place.  
The discussions of these intuitions help make clear the high intuitive costs of biting 
the bullet and accepting PR. In accepting Posthumous Repugnancy as true, one commits 
to it being reasonable to fear that despite having lived an amazing life right up until 
death, one actually has a life not worth living. And one commits to it being reasonable to 
commit suicide and forgo decades of great life solely to avoid a large number of small 
posthumous harms. 
All that being said, one could still accept PR despite its great implausibility. It is 
true that many philosophers accept Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusions (RC) despite its initial 
implausibility. So why not take the same route with PR?  
The disanalogies between Parfit’s RC and our PR seriously undercut such a 
strategy. Most importantly, the primary motivation for accepting Parfit’s RC is that 
however implausible the RC may seem, it is not as implausible as denying any one of the 
claims from which it follows—that better than is transitive, that adding a life worth living 
does not make a world worse ceteris paribus, and that increasing both the average and 
the total utility of a world makes that world better all other things being equal.13 
But no such thing can be said of Posthumous Repugnancy. To reject PR, we need 
only reject the possibility of posthumous harm, and the posthumous harm thesis is 
controversial to begin with. The Repugnant Conclusion is so hard to avoid because to do 
 
13 Here I am following Huemer’s (2008) characterization.  
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so, we need to give up what look to be obvious moral truths. This is not analogous to PR. 
We can avoid PR merely by denying a controversial thesis about harm.   
 
§7. On the supposed limits of harm  
Rosa had a life of extremely high wellbeing while she was alive, but, if posthumous harm 
is possible, she repeatedly incurred small posthumous harms over a long enough period of 
time such that she had a life not worth living. The initial response to the case usually is 
along the following lines: “Can’t Rosa be posthumously harmed only so much, or up to a 
point? Posthumous harm is possible, but there’s just no way that posthumous harm, 
however long it goes on, can render an otherwise good life not worth living.” Whatever 
the details, the response is that for some reason the posthumous harms just cannot 
outweigh the positive value of Rosa’s lived life.  
 Parfit expresses something like this view when he compares two possible futures 
for himself—a Century of Ecstasy vs. a Drab Eternity.  
Suppose that I can choose between two futures. I could live for another 100 
years, all of an extremely high quality. Call this the Century of Ecstasy. I 
could instead live forever, with a life that would always be barely worth 
living. Though there would be nothing bad in this life, the only good things 
would be muzak and potatoes. Call this the Drab Eternity.  
I believe that, of these two, the Century of Ecstasy would give me a better 
future. And this is the future that I would prefer. Many people would have 
the same belief, and preference.  
 
On one view about what makes our lives go best, we would be making a 
mistake. On this view, though the Century of Ecstasy would have great 
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value for me, this value would be finite, or have an upper limit. In contrast, 
since each day in the Drab Eternity would have the same small value for 
me, there would be no limit to the total value for me of this second life. This 
value must, in the end, be greater than the limited value of the Century of 
Ecstasy.  
 
I reject this view. I claim that, though each day of the Drab Eternity would 
be worth living, the Century of Ecstasy would give me a better life…The 
Century of Ecstasy would be better for me in an essentially qualitative way. 
Though each day of the Drab Eternity would have some value for me, no 
amount of this value could be as good for me as the Century of Ecstasy. 
(Parfit 2004: pp. 17-18) 
 
Parfit’s view is that there is a lexical priority in the values being compared in the 
Century of Ecstasy (CE) vs. the Drab Eternity (DE).14 Parfit claims that the value of the 
CE would be better in an “essentially qualitative way” and that “no amount” of the value 
of the DE could be as good as the value of the CE. Lexical priority is the only way that 
the DE could have value and yet an infinite amount of that value not outweigh the finite 
value of the CE.  
Applied to Posthumous Repugnancy, such a response would say that the value of 
life pre-death is lexically prior to the value involved in posthumous harm and benefit. 
Thus, posthumous harm has non-zero disvalue, yet no amount of posthumous harm will 
ever outweigh the positive value one’s life accrued before death. Put otherwise, PR is not 
possible even if the amount of posthumous harm is infinite. This is just how no amount 
of the good from the Drab Eternity can outweigh the good of the Century of Ecstasy.  
 
14 The lexical priority claim is often expressed by saying that there is a discontinuity in the values involved 
in the CE vs. DE. 
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Parfit’s discussion of the Century of Ecstasy and the Drab Eternity is brief, only a 
few paragraphs. He gives no full-fledged argument in defense of his position. He only draws 
a comparison to John Stuart Mill’s qualitative distinction between “higher” and “lower” 
pleasures15, and notes that many share his beliefs and preference in such cases.16  
It is well known that lexical priority views like Parfit’s are problematic.17 Parfit’s 
view entails that no amount of drab (but still positive) value would be better than any 
amount of ecstasy value. Thus, if I have to choose between two futures, an ecstasy future, 
no matter how short, will be better than the drab but still good future, no matter how 
long. Three seconds of ecstasy followed by death would be a better future for me than 20 
drab, but still good, years before I die. It would also be the case that a brief future of 
intense suffering—the several seconds after stubbing a toe—would be worse for me than 
an eternal mild hell. I doubt many would share a preference for a mild hell over a stubbed 
toe.  
When applied to posthumous harm in particular, lexical priority renders it trivial. 
Imagine an extremely small pre-death harm, x. Say x harmed me in the following way: 
Incurring x brought me from a state of maximal euphoria to a state that was 99.999…% 
of maximal euphoria. Now take an infinite amount of posthumous harm y. According to 
this Parfit-inspired response, x would be worse for me than y. If posthumous harm is such 
 
15 J.S. Mill (1863), Ch. 2 
16 Parfit (2004: pp. 17-19) 
17 For discussions of the problems arising out of lexical priority views, see Lemos (1993) and Huemer (2010). 
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that an infinite amount of it is less harmful than this puny pre-death harm, one might 
wonder whether posthumous harm is worth caring about at all. On this view, if I could 
spare you the slightest pre-death harm you can imagine, or I could spare you an infinite 
series of the worst posthumous harms you can imagine, I ought to spare you the slight 
pre-death harm. Being spared the pre-death harm is what would be better for you.  
On such a view the effect on a person’s wellbeing of an individual posthumous 
harm (however large) is utterly trivial, it perhaps infinitesimal. This does not square well 
with the initial Nagel-Feinberg intuitions with which our discussion started. The intuition 
in Nagel-Feinberg cases—e.g. your spouse is cheating on you, but you do not know it—is 
that you are significantly harmed. The intuition in Nagel-Feinberg cases is not that you 
are infinitesimally harmed, and that an infinite number of Nagel-Feinberg case harms 
would not be as bad for you as the smallest possible amount of felt harm. Reflecting on 
these considerations, the lexically priority response looks like a dead end.18  
The posthumous harm proponent might try at this point to pivot to the claim that 
posthumous harm and pre-death harm are incommensurable—that they cannot measured 
on the same scale, or otherwise compared in quantity or magnitude. Parfit’s claim that 
 
18 Ironically, were the posthumous harm proponent to take go the lexical priority route they would be 
saddled with the position that we ought to respect the wishes of the dead (or the wellbeing of the dead) 
much less than we do now. Why execute the will of the deceased when a failure to do so would be infinitely 
less bad than the slight inconvenience that is done to you by signing some paperwork? Why refrain from 
posthumously framing your rival for crimes against humanity when the harm done to him will pale in 
comparison to the pain you’d incur having to resist framing him? Obviously, someone rejecting the 
possibility of posthumous harm must ultimately answer these difficult questions, but it is very strange to 
be a proponent of posthumous harm and still have to answer these questions. The lexical priority proponent 
winds up having to do the double duty of explaining how there is posthumous harm and yet all our intuitions 
about it are wrong. 
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there is an essential “qualitative” difference between the CE and DE does have the ring of 
incommensurability. Suppose one takes the incommensurability route. Immediately it is 
asked, “Though incommensurable with pre-death harm, does posthumous harm negatively 
affect one’s wellbeing nonetheless? Put otherwise, when one is posthumously harmed, is 
their life made worse?”  
The posthumous harm proponent cannot answer “No” to this question. If being 
posthumously harmed does not negatively affects one’s wellbeing, then posthumous harm 
is not actually any kind of harm at all, for it is analytic that harm makes one worse off in 
some way.  But to answer, “Yes, posthumous harm negatively affects one’s wellbeing,” one 
must explain how it is that posthumous harm negatively affects one’s wellbeing and pre-
death harm negatively affects one’s wellbeing, and yet they still cannot be compared at 
all. Here one would have to claim that there are different ways to negatively affect one’s 
wellbeing. Further, the way posthumous harm negatively affects one’s wellbeing is 
incommensurable with the way pre-death harm negatively affects one’s wellbeing. Even if 
we accept that picture, the fact that posthumous harm negatively affects one’s wellbeing 
at all leaves open that it can be negatively affect enough to make their life not worth 
living. Even if we set aside as incommensurable pre-death harm and benefit, posthumous 
harm still aggregates.19  
 
19 Boonin (2019: pp 178-179) confronts a related problem and winds up in the same place as we do. He is 
concerned with how to compare on a single scale the harmfulness of unfelt harms to felt harms in a way 
that is non-arbitrary but also does not make unfelt harms lexically prior in harmfulness. In brief, felt harms 
and unfelt harms are weighted according to how much one would want to avoid them. If S prefers to avoid 
an unfelt harm h twice as much as a felt harm f, then on Boonin’s view h would be twice as harmful for S 
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To stop the aggregation of posthumous harm on this incommensurability picture, 
the posthumous harm proponent obviously should not appeal to the lexical priority claim 
that no amount of posthumous harm can outweigh the value of a lived life, and that no 
amount of posthumous harm is worse than any amount of pre-death harm. It was the 
spectacular failure of lexical priority strategy that motivated the move to the 
incommensurability strategy.  
The posthumous harm proponent ought to go looking for better. What is needed 
is something to prevent posthumous harms from sufficiently aggregating to outweigh the 
large positive amount of pre-death wellbeing, yet not render posthumous harms trivial or 
their effect on wellbeing infinitesimal. If the posthumous harm proponent does not appeal 
to lexical priority, or incommensurability, what then is left? 
The sufficient aggregation of posthumous harm might be blocked by either a 
diminishing marginal value effect on posthumous harm such that posthumous harms 
become less and less harmful, or by a limit on the amount of posthumous harm a person 
can incur no matter what. Suitably formulated, either could prevent posthumous harms 
from rendering an otherwise great life not worth living.  
How could posthumous harms diminish in harmfulness, or cease to be harmful at 
 
than f. Notice that this is just what we have been assuming as our starting point—that the harmfulness of 
a desire frustration is a function of the strength of the desire. Whether or not the desire frustration leads to 
pre-death or posthumous harm does not matter. Since that view is perfectly compatible with posthumous 
repugnancy, we’ve tried examining the alternatives—incommensurability and lexical priority—but those 
turned out to be too problematic. Boonin starts with incommensurability and lexical priority, finds them 
too problematic, and lands on a view that just so happens be the one we started with, and one that is 
perfectly compatible with posthumous repugnancy.  
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some limit, when the natural basis of the repeated posthumous harms—the strength of 
the desire, its content, and the degree to which it is frustrated—remains fixed? The 
strength and content of one’s desires do not change after their death. The only explanation 
for posthumous harm diminishing in harmfulness, or else having a hard limit, would be 
that posthumous harm has either of these properties essentially. But this is problematic. 
Take a series of temporally successive qualitatively identical posthumous desire 
frustrations, F1-F…. The desire frustrations differ only in their location in the series (i.e. 
they differ only in when they happened), everything else has been fixed by death. On the 
diminishing posthumous harm proposal, how harmful any frustration Fn is will be a 
function of Fn’s location in the series. The harmfulness of each F diminishes as the series 
goes on, but all members of the series are otherwise identical. Thus, I could know 
everything there is to know about a desire frustration, Fn, other than where Fn occurs in 
the series, and yet not be able to tell you how harmful Fn is. If Fn is at the beginning of 
the series it could very harmful, but if Fn is much further on in the series it could be 
barely harmful at all. I could know everything there is to know about a pair of desire 
frustrations Fn and Fr and I will not be able to tell you which is more harmful if I do not 
know the location in the series of both Fn and Fr. More concretely, I could know—a)  that 
when a person’s desire is frustrated they are harmed, b) that Dwight strongly desired his 
partner not cheat on him, b) that Dwight’s partner cheated on him, and c) the first time 
it happened Dwight was very harmed by this—but I would not be able to tell you on that 
basis whether another identical frustration was for Dwight similarly very harmful or barely 
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harmful at all, unless I knew when in the temporal series it appears.  
On the posthumous-harm-is-limited view, whether or not some desire frustration 
Fx is harmful at all is determined by Fx’s location in the series F1-F…. On this view there 
is some n such that desire frustrations F1 through Fn are equally harmful, but every 
frustration from Fn+1 on is not harmful at all. Thus, I could know everything there is to 
know about that a desire frustration, Fx, other than where Fx is in the series and not be 
able to tell you if Fx is very harmful or not harmful. If Fx is at the beginning of the series 
it could very harmful, but if it is late enough in the series Fx could be not harmful at all 
even though none of its other properties would change with a change in its location in the 
series. And a further difficulty with this view is that even if I knew where in the series the 
Fx was, I still would not know whether or not it was harmful because I would need to 
know where the limit is. Knowing everything about the F’s in the series will not tell me 
which number of frustrations, n, is the magic number where the qualitatively identical 
frustrations after Fn cease to be harmful. More concretely, I could know that the 100th 
time Dwight was spoken of negatively behind his back was very harmful (given his desire 
that it not happen), and be totally unable to tell you whether the 101th time it would be 
harmful to him at all, even though the 100th and 101st instances were qualitatively 
identical.  
It would be strange indeed if knowing everything about a desire frustration other 
than where it appears in a series of identical frustrations would not be enough to have 
any guess as to the extent of the harmfulness of the frustration. I would have no clue 
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whether the frustration is very harmful, barely harmful, not at all harmful, or anywhere 
in between. Knowing everything about the frustration other than its location in the series 
would not even be enough to know whether it is more or less likely that the frustration is 
very harmful than not at all harmful. Put otherwise, unless you know where a posthumous 
desire frustration lies in a series of identical frustrations, you cannot know anything about 
that frustration’s level of harmfulness. On the limit view, you could even know the desire 
frustration’s location in series and still not know whether it is harmful or not, for you’d 
have to know where the limit is as well.  
It will be helpful to make the case more concrete. Let’s return to the hypothetical 
Nagel-Feinberg cases with which our discussion of posthumous harm began. Reflecting on 
such cases I think we will see that in pre-death cases of desire frustration where the 
strength and content of a desire remains fixed, it does not appear that the harmfulness of 
the desire’s frustration diminishes merely in virtue of repetition. Nor does it appear to 
reach some limit all on its own. Imagine that someone is spreading libelous rumors about 
you, but you never find out about it, nor are you otherwise affected at all. Surely, Nagel 
and Feinberg think, you will judge that you have been harmed.  
Let’s iterate this Nagel-Feinberg case. Suppose you’re a travelling salesperson. 
Every three months you move to a new region, make new short-term friends, and then 
move again. You enjoy your job, and you’re good at it, and you’ve been doing it for 30 
years. However, unbeknownst to you, you have a stealth slanderer and he is quite a 
persistent fellow. Perhaps he felt slighted by you in high school and has been on a mission 
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to stealthily slander you as long as you live. He’s followed you as you’ve moved around, 
slandering you behind your back in each new venue. Assume that throughout your adult 
life your desire not to be slandered and to enjoy a good reputation has remained 
constant—same object and same strength. If Nagel and Feinberg are right and one 
instance of being slandered behind your back is harmful, then what reason would there 
be to think that more instances of the very same harm would become less and less harmful 
in virtue of repetition alone when you do not know about them nor experience any of their 
effects? What reason would there be to think that at some point during the stealth 
slandering the slander would just cease to be harmful? Put otherwise, the facts have 
stayed the same—same harm, same desire, same strength of desiring, your complete lack 
of experiencing effects of the harm—the only thing that changes over time is how many 
times you’ve been slandered before. It does not appear that the harmfulness of the slander 
will diminish merely in virtue of how many times you are slandered if all other facts 
remain constant. Nor does it appear that the stealth slander would just stop being harmful 
all on its own. If that were the case, then there would be some n number of slanders such 
that slanders 1 through n were harmful but every slander from n+1 on was not harmful 
at all even though the only difference between slanders n and n+1 is simply how many 
slanders preceded them.  
If the harmfulness of the slander in the iterated Nagel-Feinberg case above does 
not diminish nor does it reach a limit, then what reason is there to think that posthumous 
harm has either property? Remember that the posthumous harm view is motivated 
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fundamentally by the intuition in the Nagel-Feinberg cases that one can be harmed 
without one’s experience ever being affected by that which has harmed them.  
 
§8. Conclusion 
The case for posthumous harm rests crucially on the Nagel-Feinberg intuition that an 
agent is harmed when their desires are frustrated, even if they in no way experience effects 
of the frustration. We must now reassess that intuition given where we have ended up in 
our discussion of posthumous repugnancy. Which of the following fares best?  
 
A. Bite the bullet and accept Posthumous Repugnancy: Trust the intuition that we 
are harmed in posthumous Nagel-Feinberg cases. Posthumous harm is possible, 
which entails Posthumous Repugnancy. Distrust the No Reasonable Fear of PR 
Intuition and the No Rational Preventative Suicide Option Intuition.  
 
B. Bite other bullets: Trust the intuition that we are harmed in posthumous Nagel-
Feinberg cases. Posthumous harm is possible, but it does not entail Posthumous 
Repugnancy. That is because it is an essential property of posthumous harm that 
an individual can be posthumously harmed only so much, or else posthumous harm 
is marginally diminishing in harmfulness. These properties are not, however, 
properties of the unfelt harm involved in iterated non-posthumous Nagel-Feinberg 
cases.  
 
C. Reject the possibility of posthumous harm: Posthumous harm is not possible and 
therefore Posthumous Repugnancy is not possible. Trust the No Reasonable Fear 
of PR Intuition and the No Rational Preventative Suicide Option Intuition. 
Distrust the intuition that we are harmed in posthumous Nagel-Feinberg cases.  
 
Weighing A, B, C, it seems more plausible that our Nagel-Feinberg intuitions are in error 
about posthumous Nagel-Feinberg cases than that PR is possible, or that PR is not 
possible because posthumous harm has either of the essential properties necessary to block 
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PR (i.e. a built-in limit or diminishing marginal harmfulness), neither of which is property 
of the unfelt harm in non-posthumous Nagel-Feinberg cases.  
On balance, C fares best from among the options, and so we ought to accept it 
over A or B. We ought to reject the possibility of posthumous harm.  
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